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The interests of the three parties to the regulatory process
—
the utility investors, the consumers, and the regulators—are often
in conflict. Investors are concerned with shareholder wealth maximi-
zation while consumers desire dependable service at low rates. If
the desired end product of regulation is to establish rates that
balance the interests of consumers and investors, then a planning model
is needed which accurately reflects the multiobjective nature of the
regulatory decision process. This paper develops such a multiobjective
programming model for examining the efficient trade-offs available to
utility regulators in setting rates of return.
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A MULTIOBJECTIVE MODEL FOR ELECTRIC
UTILITY RATE REGULATION
Much of the electric utility regulatory process revolves around the
presentation and rebuttal of expert testimony regarding "just and reason-
able" rates of return that provide "a balancing of the investor and con-
sumer interests" [2, 603]. More often than not the discrepancy be-
tween the rate of return a utility requests and what the regulatory
commission staff and consumer interveners recommend is substantial.
Such conflicting views are to be expected because the interests of in-
vestors and consumers are often in conflict. Investors are concerned
with shareholders wealth maximization while consumers desire dependable
service at low rates. Because of the "natural monopoly" status of elec-
tric utilities, it is the job of regulatory commissions to resolve this
inherent conflict between investors and customers by setting "fair and
reasonable" rates.
If the desired end product of regulation is to establish rates that
balance the interests of consumers and investors, then a planning model
is needed which accurately reflects the multiobjective nature of the
regulatory decision process. The purpose of this paper is to develop
such a multiobjective programming model for examining the efficient
trade-offs available to utility regulators in setting rates of return.
The planning model will focus upon the objectives of the three parties
to the regulatory process: the utility investors, the consumers, and the
regulators. The model will incorporate inflation, anticipated growth rates
in user demand, the resulting need for capital expenditures and financ-
ing, as well as targets specifying an "appropriate" capital structure.
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and dividend policy. By simultaneously considering these factors in
conjunction with the utility's need for revenues and customers' desire
for low cost but dependable service, the programming model will identify
the efficient, nondominated alternatives which "best satisfy" all par-
ties to the regulatory process.
Following a brief overview of the rate regulatory process and the
differences between traditional and multiobjective programming models,
a multiple criteria utility rate regulation model is developed. An
evaluation of the model's efficient solutions are explored next. This
analysis describes an evaluation process that regulatory commissions
might use in examining the trade-offs between investors and consumers.
Concluding comments appear in the last section.
an' ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE REGULATION MODEL
The rate making process acts as a substitute for competitive market
mechanisms by determining how prices and services are to be provided at
reasonable levels by profit oriented monopolies. Under a market system
firms determine their operating and financial risk-return profiles via
complex, interdependent decisions. These decisions are based upon the
potential market (s) to be served, the alternative product generating
function(s) available, and a variety of possible capital structures.
Under regulation firms are constrained in the pursuit of risk-return
objectives. Commissions regulate electric utilities by approving ser-
vice price structures that are expected to generate sufficient revenues
to allow recovery of operating costs, depreciation, interest and taxes,
plus a fair return on equity investment. As such, rate regulation
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affects the calculation of required revenues, the prices customers pay,
and the stream of cash flows to equity investors.
Exhibit 1 presents a simplified overview of a process designed to
establish "just and reasonable" rates of return. To recommend a "rate
of return," a commission must first accept an appropriate capital struc-
ture for an approved capital base. Then returns on debt and equity cap-
ital are established. Finally, a weighted average of these rates is
applied to the capital (rate) base. This required return to capital
suppliers plus an acceptable level of operating expenses (including de-
preciation and taxes) determine the required revenues that must be gen-
erated. The last step in the regulatory process is to approve a service
price structure that will interact with expected demand and generate the
needed revenues that allow recovery of operating costs, depreciation,
interest and taxes, plus a fair return to equity.
Almost all of the variables shown in Exhibit 1 are subjects of con-
troversy in regulatory proceedings. Perhaps the greatest source of con-
troversy is the "just and reasonable" rate of return to equity holders.
Expert witnesses in a rate case often recommend widely differing rates.
Other areas of regulatory controversy include the appropriate propor-
tions of debt and equity in the capital structure, the appropriate level
of the capital base, the reasonableness of the level of operating ex-
penses, and the service price structure. There is a tendency in current
regulatory practice to isolate decision areas. For example, consider
the return on rate base issue which is dependent upon a given
capital structure. A utility's (current or anticipated) financing





















o 3 •H (U
iH 4J O. cn
i-t <U OB CO




o c u <0
u O 4J













































0) ^ 60 •r-l 0) CO 4J
S CO CO CO > c ja
•H <U CO 3 o o <u















































equity, even though neither theoretical nor practical considerations
support such an artificial separation.
Given the interdependencles among many of these areas of contro-
versy, rate regulation requires simultaneous consideration of the deci-
sion options facing a utility. Although a static analysis may generate
reasonable regulatory decisions, it is difficult to detect if a series
of regulatory decisions derived through static or partial equilibrium
analysis are suboptimal. Because regulation must reflect the dynamic
interdependencles of all policy variables, a simultaneous equations
planning model is essential in utility regulation. A successful model
should collapse a multi-stage process into a single stage decision which
provides simultaneous consideration of the inherent interdependencles
encountered in rate regulation.
In a recent article [4] Alexander A. Robichek offered an alter-
native approach to the conventional regulatory process of determining
"just and reasonable" rates which recognized the need for simultaneous
consideration of decision options facing a utility. Robichek' s proposal
followed capital asset pricing model (CAPM) logic and required the fol-
lowing conditions exist:
1. The utility's operating expenses are judged to be reasonable;
2. The utility's expansion policy is appropriate to the needs of
the consumers;
3. The utility's financial structure is appropriate;
4. The utility's specific financing choices (e.g., of debt or
equity issues) are justified; and
5. The regulation of the utility's rate of return was judged "just
and reasonable" as of a previous point of time. This point of
time would then serve as the starting point from which to judge
the fairness of realized rates.
If these conditions are met, Robichek' s regulatory approach would provide
a basis for resolving some of the current conflicts in rate making.
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The application of this CAPM approach would require a significant
change in the current regulation process. More specifically, the ap-
proach would require. . .
. . . the utility and the regulators to agree on the specific para-
meters and time period along which to measure the "just and
reasonable" rate of return to equity investors;
. . .
the regulators to approve the planned major items of operating
expenses, such as salaries, labor contracts, etc., and major
capital commitments ; and
... an agreement as to the appropriate capital structure for the
utility and the major financing decisions in the planning
period.
Robichek. argued his approach to rate-making would eliminate some of the
current problems facing regulators while causing a few new ones. Some
problems would remain, such as how to compensate efficiency and penalize
inefficiency, how to set fair user rate schedules, and how to resolve
differences of judgment between the utility and the commission staff.
The programming model presented in this paper is a first step toward
implementing the Robichek regulatory approach.
A Multiple Objective Approach to Rate Regulation
The two phase mxiltiple objective programming algorithm and computer
codes utilized in this study were developed by Ralph E. Steuer [10, 11, 12].
Unlike traditional single objective fxinction linear programming approaches
to financial planning [1, 3], phase one of Steuer's multiobjective algorithm
attempts to solve the following vector maximization problem:
eff {Cx = Z IX e S, C e R^ X r"^}.
X c' '
In this problem, S is a feasible region {XeR|Ax— b, bcR}, C
is a criteria matrix that linearly relates a vector of decision variables.
-7-
X, to a vector of criteria values, Z . A is a matrix of technological
coefficients that relate the decision variables to a vector of con-
straint values, b, and eff denotes that all efficient extreme points of
S with respect to C are to be found. A point, x £ S, is defined as ef-
ficient if and only if no other feasible point, x e S, exists, such that
Cx ^ Cx, Cx ¥^ Cx.
Although somewhat tedious, this maximization problem is relatively
straightforward. It stipulates that the solution algorithm should gen-
erate all possible feasible solutions that simultaneously optimize the
specified criteria. However, given the inherent trade-offs of public
utility regulation, it is virtually impossible to find a single solution
that will optimize all objectives simultaneously. Instead the output
of the first phase of Steuer's algorithm provides a set of efficient
solutions.
Phase two of the Steuer algorithm utilizes a filtering process on
the phase one efficient extreme points' criteria values. Although
several filtering options are available in Steuer's computer codes, this
study employs the "nondominated" alternative. In this "nondominated
mode" a pairwise comparison of all efficient solutions is made. All
dominated or inferior points are eliminated until only nondominated so-
lutions remain. Unfortunately an in-depth presentation of the Steuer
algorithms is beyond the scope of this study; however, see [10, 11]
for an enlightening review.
It is worth emphasizing an important aspect of multiobjective
linear programming. These algorithms are capable of dealing
only with linear constraints and objective functions. As such.
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typical multiplicative relationships such as earnings, price, and divi-
dends per share cannot be incorporated into the model unless one is will-
ing to specify a selling price(s) per share. Because these selling
prices do not consider the simultaneous nature of a given solution,
their use is suspect. However, given solution values for aggregate book
and market value, it is possible to derive per share figures after all
nondominated solutions have been determined. Accordingly, it is neces-
sary to filter the nondominated solutions through a second filter, which
can incorporate these critical non-linear relationships and determine
financially feasible and viable alternatives from the set of efficient,
nondominated solutions. A detailed description of this second filtering
process is given in the discussion of the model's results.
Formulation of the Model
As in all mathematical models, underlying assumptions are crucial.
The majority of our assumptions and the variable definitions are given
respectively in Exhibits 2 and 3. In this formulation, Robichek's five
criteria mentioned earlier are assiomed to hold.
Several aspects of Exhibit 2 are worth noting. The model will span
a three year planning horizon. Initially, the utility has a capital
base of $2.5 billion, with a debt/equity ratio of 1. During the planning
periods, the firm is expected to operate in an environment in which equity
investors in electric utilities have a required return of 15 percent, and
electric utility stocks sell at a dividend valuation multiple of 10.667.
A dividend valuation multiple of 10.667 is consistent with a dividend
payout of .75 and the current Standard & Poor utility index price-
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After-Cax $ return on beginning
rate base in period t
Exhibit 3





BVB : Ending book value of all debt
outstanding in period 3
1.173 + .94ADj^ + .9(>i^2 + .98M) (2)
BVE : Ending book value of "old" and
"new" equity outstanding in
period 3
NW + iE + iE, + 4E^ (3)
CB Rate Base or Capital Base at










Internal Cash Flow before Invest-
nent and dividends occurlng In
period t:
Sale of debt In period t:
CF " $AR + Depreciation - After-tax Debt Charges
- Maintenance Adjustment







$AIU + 450 - 71.8 - .0799iD
0811540^ - .0824402 - .OlSUD





DIV Total dividends paid in period
t: DIV
EBIT : Earnings before interest and
taxes in period t
NI ,,._ > + total pretax Interest expenses in period t
EBIT,
EBIT,
"1/.52 ^ "•" ^ -^240^
NIj, 22 + •91.875 .11764Dj^ + .12iD2




IE. Net :> of equity sold In period
t or "new equity": 4B.
HVE : Market value of equity at the
end of period 3 10.667DIV, (7)
NI
:tw
Total net Income earned in
period t
"t^
«1 - 'h ^
NI2 = CF^ +
NI,
CF^ + Sinking Fund Payments - Depreciation
.024D + 25 - 350
.02(40, + 40,] + 25 - 400
CF + .02[4D + 4D + 40 ] + 25 - 450
Net worth of value of "old
equity at the end of period c
NW, - 1,250 + NI







NW, • NW, + NI, - DIV
DIV,









Variable Definitions of the Model
Variable Dcfinicio" Alsebraie Formulation liquation
PVBE:
XRB
Present value at period
of initial and new equity
outstanding at the end of
period 3
Return on rate base or





iROP: Value in $ of regulatory
overpricing at the end of
period 3
$RUP: Value in $ of regulatory
underprlcing at the end
of period 3;
$ROP - $RUP - MVE - BVE- (U)
TDIV: Total dividends paid during
the planning periods
TEBIT: Total earnings before interest




Total debt related fixed
charges incurred during the
planning periods
Total net Income earned
during the planning periods
Corporate tax rate
DIV + DIV^ + DIV
EBIT, + EBIT + EBIT,
.46818AD + .31452iiD, + .15866iiD, + 419.356






IT) Unfulfilled consumer demand
occurlng in period C: UD » anticipated demand - generating capacity
UDj^ - 26,750 - lO.SCBg
UD^ - 28,075 - IG.SCB^





Significant growth in power demand is anticipated during the
planning horizon. To accomodate this growth, major additions to the
capital base are needed. Although somewhat artificial, all investments
are assumed to occur at the beginning of each planning period; however
as seen in equation (1) in Exhibit 3, the after-tax allowed dollar re-
turn in a given period is calctilated on the basis of the previous pe-
riod's ending capital base.
Equations (2) and (3) define the ending book values of debt and
equity in period three. Equations (4.1) through (5.3) provide the val-
ues for end of period capital base and internal cash flow, respectively,
for each period. Similarly, (6.1) through (8.3) define respective pe-
riod values for earnings before interest and taxes calculated at a 48
percent rate, ending equity market value, and total dollar net income.
Equations (9.1) through (9.3) define end of period net worth. In order
to facilitate analysis of phase two filtering results, it was necessai^r
to distinguish betwen "internal" and "external" equity funds for valuation
purposes.
In equation (10) the period present value of equity book value
is defined. Equation (11) introduces two regulatory variables that
proxy the efficiency of regulation via the discrepancy between book and
market values. Equations (12) through (15) define total cumulative
dividends, earnings before interest and taxes, debt related fixed
charges, and net income, respectively, during the three year planning
horizon. Equations (16.1) through (16.3) define per period unfulfilled
consumer demand. From a technical viewpoint, this unfulfilled demand
will be met by foregoing normal maintenance (downtime) procedures. How-
ever, the additional operating expenses associated with poor maintenance
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will cause "unfulfilled" demand to drain cash flows in subsequent pe-
riods (see equations (5.2) and (5.3)). Four final variables require
definition: AD
,
DIV , AE , and RRB . Respectively these are defined
in period t to be sale of debt in dollars, total dollar dividends paid,
net dollar value (after floatation costs) of equity sold, and return on
beginning rate base.
Objective Function Formulation
For operational purposes, the utility regulation model has five
goals that are attributable to three constituencies. These constitu-
encies, goal descriptions, and algebraic formulations are given in
Exhibit 4. Equation (17) specifies a consumer oriented goal that at-
tempts to minimize total allowed dollar returns during each of the
planning periods.
Shareholder or corporate goals are specified in equations (18)
through (20). The first corporate goal states that the algorithm should
maximize the discounted present value of all future cash flows that
accrue to shareholders as dividends. The last term in this equation
represents an ending market value of aggregate equity determined by the
10,667 dividend multiple given earlier in Exhibit 2. The second share-
holder goal is given in equation (10). This goal attempts to minimize
possible dilution of existing equity by minimizing the sale of common
stock. The final corporate goal is seen in (20) ; this criterion maxi-
mizes future internal corporate cash flow during the planning horizon.
Equation (21) specifies the remaining goal or criterion of the
model. It attempts to supress regulatory excess or perniciousness by
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Given the conflicting nature of these five goals, it is apparent
that the ability to compromise and incorporate trade-offs in the
regulatory process is essential. In order to accommodate this flexibil-
ity requirement, the model has four sets of operational and financial
constraints designed to specify reasonable ranges for corporate and reg-
ulatory policies. These constraint sets are given in Exhibit 5.
Equations (22) - (24,2) specify the five sets of regulatory con-
straints. In (22) upper and lower limits on the annual returns on be-
ginning capital bases are given. In addition (23,1) and (23.2) provide
maximum limits of 25 basis points on annual changes in returns on appro-
priate capital bases. The final two regulatory constraints place upper
and lower limits on the ratio of equity market to book value. Equation
(24.1) limits the aggregate period zero market value, less the aggregate
present value of "new" stock, to be less than or equal to 110% of be-
ginning equity book value. In similar fashion (24.2) states that these
present values should be at least 90% of beginning equity book value.
The next two sets of the model's constraints are related to cor-
porate dividend as well as financial leverage and coverage policies.
Equation (25) limits the annual maximum dividend payout to be no greater
than 75%, while (26) specifies a minimum dividend yield on all equity
sources to be 10%, Maximum and minimum debt/equity ratios of 1.105 and
,905 respectively are outlined in equations (27,1) through (28.3).
Finally, minimum annual fixed coverage charges of 1.5 are given in
(29.1) through (29,3).
The last two sets of constraints are given in (30.1) through (31.3).
These require that each period's ending assets equal total liabilities
and that all sources of cash equate to all uses in each planning period.
RECVLATOKY
Exhibit 5
CooBCialats of Multiple Criterion Kodel
Klnlinum aaxi Hajclmtim allowable
returns on the rate baeet
Kaxlnua year to year change In
return on rate base
.09 <. RRB <_ .11
SRB^ - W^j.j^ i. -0025 (t - 2,3)





Perlo4 market value - present value
of "new" stock should aot exceed
IIOZ of period equity book value
DIV DIV DIV + 10.667DIV iE 4E
^ 42, -
-rr4rr ^ < 1.375 (24.1)
^^•^^^ (1.15)^ (1.15)^ "l (1.15) (1.15) 2
-
Period marlcet value - present
value of "new stock." suae be at
least 90Z of period equity book
value
DIV DIV DIV, + 10.667DIV iE, 4E
—
-
+ =-:• + :
- AE, -
-—-rr ^ >.1,125 (24.2)
'^•"^ (1.15)^ (1.15)^
-1 (1.15) (,^^j2 -^
DIVIDEJiD POLICY
Kaxlnum Dividend Payout of 7SZ
Hlnlmua Dividend Yield of lOZ
DIV £ .75NI^






X"-^"""" debt celling: do not
allow debt/equity ratio to
exceed 1.105 In any year
t - 1 1.105[i«j^ + AEj^] >. 1,225 + .9StD^ (27.1)
t - 2 I.IOSCNW^ + AEj^ + iE^J i 1,200 + .9640^^ + .93ADj (27.2)
t - 3 1.105(HW + 4£j^ + iE + iE-] >, 1,175 + .94iD + .96AO + .98AD (27.3)
Hlnlaun debt Ualta: do not
allow debt/equity ratio to
fall below .90S in any year
t » 1 .SOStNtfj^ + iEj^] <. 1,223 + .98ADj^
t - 2 .905[NW2 + iEj_ + iE^J i 1,200 + .96iDj^ + .96iD2
t - 3 .905[NU2 + iEj^ + iEj + AEj] <_ 1,175 + .94iDj^ +
(28.1)
(28.2)
.96ia^ + .gSADj (28.3)
Fixed charge coverage should
be at least 1.5 In each year
t - 1 .667EBITj^ >_ .15846iD + 141.827
t - 2 .667EBIT >_ .15506iD + .15846AD, + 139.952




SOtJRCES OF FUNDS EQUAL USES
Assets equal llabllltiea
for each period
t - 1 CBj^ - NW, + iE + 1,225 + .98iD
t - 2 CB, - NW + iE + 4E + 1,200 + .96iD + .98AD




- HWj + iEj^ + iEj + iEj + 1,175 + .94iD + .96iD + .9SiD (30.3)
Sources of cash equal uses
of cash for each period
t - 1 iE + iD - DIV + CF - 500
2 iE, 4D, DIV + CF 650






The initial filtering phase generated 224 nondominated extreme
points from over 352 efficient solutions. The linear requirements of
the Steuer algorithm did not allow calculation of per share data [such
as earnings per share (EPS), dividends per share (DPS), book value per
share (BVPS)] or profitability and leverage ratios to aid in the evalua-
tion of the relative attractiveness of the 224 nondominated extreme
points. This was done outside the Steuer algorithm using assumptions
consistent with the original model and financial theory. A flow chart
of the second filtering phase is contained in Exhibit 6. Values gen-
erated by the Steuer algorithm permitted calculation of the ending debt/
equity ratio, return on book value, average fixed coverage ratio, average
dividend payout percentage, ending market/book value ratio, and the
average return on rate base. Share data were derived after first esti-
mating the number of equity shares issued to raise the amount of common
stock financing in each time period for each Steuer algorithm solution.
A stock market price at time period zero (F ) was estimated by multiplying
time period zero BVPS (BVPS.) by the ending (aggregate) market/book
value ratio from the Steuer algorithm. This price deteirmination pro-
cedure assumes investors will correctly anticipate the performance of
the firm in the three year planning horizon. The selling price of a
common share at the beginning of time period one (SP ) is .95 P_ to
allow for market pressure and selling costs.
The number of connnon shares outstanding in time period one is
calculated by adding the number of shares at the beginning of the
period and the number issued at SP to raise the amount of common
Exhibit 6
Flow Chart of the Second Filtering Phase
Start Stop
e








Average Fixed Coverage Ratio
Average Dividend Payout %
Ending Market/Book Value Ratio
Average Return on Rate Base
Period t = 1
^
Calculated Net Price per Share
at end of period using






1 Dividends and earnings
I











+ dividend growth rate
Holding Period Return







stock financing in period one, EPS^ and DPS^ can then be derived and
provide the inputs for estimating P^ and SP» as follows:
P = 8.0 EPS ; and
SP^ = (.95) (P^) = (.95) (8.0 EPSj^).
The 8,0 P/E valuation multiple is admittedly a somewhat arbitrary choice.
However, a valuation procedure outside the Steuer algorithm is a neces-
sity if share data are to be considered in evaluating the 224 nondomi-
nated extreme points.
EPS
, DPS , P , and SP values are estimated in similar fashion
for periods two and three. These share data allow estimation of in-
vestor related variables such as the growth in EPS (G ) and DPS (G
, ),
eps dps '
and the holding period return realized by investors over the three
period planning horizon. Share data also permit estimation of equity
investors' required rate of return (k ) using the Gordon infinite
horizon DCF model.
The 224 nondominated extreme points were based on linear con-
straints and objective functions. The introduction of the multipli-
cative relationships of EPS, DPS, and price per share had a dramatic
impact on the financial viability of the nondominated solution points.
In evaluating the 224 nondominated solutions, two realistic financial
constraints were introduced to assure feasibility:
(1) DPS <_ DPS _< DPS ; and
(2) [(l+g,p3)
- g,p3]^° haTolTHtlo^ 1 ''''
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The dividend constraint precludes any reduction in DPS over the planning
period while the second constraint assures that any disparity between
G and G, will be sustainable over a decade without causing
eps dps
the dividend payout ratio to exceed the .75 limit contained in the orig-
inal model. Only seven of the 224 nondominated extreme point solutions
met these two financial feasibility constraints.
Financial data for these seven feasible solutions are organized in
Exhibit 8 to reflect the particular interests of the various parties to
the rate regulatory process. Similar data for all 224 nondominated ef-
ficient solutions are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. Spearman rank
order correlation coefficients measuring the correspondence between the
(low to high) rankings of each financial variable in Exhibit 7 plus a
variable for the volume of common stock issued are shown in Exhibit 8.
As might be anticipated with a simultaneous equation model, the system-
atic associations between the variable have the expected signs and are
often significant even when tested with a nonparametric measure.
The data contain few surprises. Return on book value is system-
atically related to the allowed return on rate base and the debt/equity
ratio. Coverage ratios track well with debt/equity ratios. EPS and
DPS growth rates as well as the payout and coverage ratios are con-
sistent with the utility industry.
Hov/ever, only three of the nondominated extreme point solutions,
numbers 57, 124, and 204, appear to provide plausible planning guides.
Even for these three solutions, the relationships between some of the
variables may not appear consistent with traditional rate base regulatory
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have to have a pre-tax debt cost that exceeded stockholders' required
return (k ) of 14.29 percent in order to have a weighted average cost
of capital equal to the average 10.876 percent return on rate base. Of
course an allowed return on rate base in excess of the firm's cost of
capital would certainly explain a market/book ratio greater than unity.
A partial explanation of this apparent disparity revolves around
the existence of a sinking fund in the model which increases the re-
quired return on the rate base by nearly 2.0 percent. In addition,
traditional analyses focuses on end of period values while the return
on rate base percentage is an average of beginning of period rates.
Solution points 57, 124, and 204 have stockholder required rates
of return (k = D^/P_ + G ) that exceed projected holding period
returns (HPR) . This relationship is consistent with what has occurred
with electric utility stocks in the past decade, but it is not descrip-
tive of a well functioning rate regulatory process.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The interests of the three parties to the regulatory process—the
utility investors, the consumers, and the regulators—are often in con-
flict. Investors are concerned with shareholder wealth maximization
while consumers desire dependable service at low rates. If the desired
end product of regulation is to establish rates that balance the interests
of consumers and investors, then a planning model is needed which accurately
reflects the multiobjective nature of the regulatory decision process.
This paper develops such a multiobjective programming model for examining
the efficient trade-offs available to utility regulators in setting rates
of returno
-23-
Generally the initial runs of the model are promising and supportive
of a simultaneous decision approach to rate regulation. There are several
possible explanations for some of the abberations in the data. The dynamics
of the evaluation procedures need further study. Ultimately a nonlinear
programming model may be required in order for multiplicative share
data manipulations and valuation to become an integral part of the
primary model. Another area for study is the impact rapid growth in
the capital budget may have upon economic rates of return and reported
accounting returns. Study of this phenomena which has been explored
elsewhere [5, 9] may provide a partial explanation of some of the
low HPR-high return on book value combinations in Exhibit 8. This
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7.44 i:i\ h\l i:i',





6.45 2.15 2,06 2.09
6.94 2.09 hli 2.172.15 2.17
2.09 2.12 2.24





6.61 2.08 2.09 2.12
6.69 2.15 2.39 2.05
5.96
ki\ 2.0O 2.196.32 2.04 2.09





6.11 2.15 2.01 1.99
5.99 2.32 2.00 2.18
6.33 2.05 2.04 2.09
4.46 l.aS 1.91 1.96







6.37 J.U 2.05 2.09





6.13 2.15 2,02 2.05










7.41 2.14 kit6.92 2.07 2.10
6.35 2.02 2.04 2.23
5.30 2.^1 1.9 7 1.90




6,99 2.09 kAt6. .5 2.15






6.65 2.11 2.09 k\l6.68 2.05 2.09
5.91 2.U 1.98 2.07
6.12 2.15 2.02 2.03





4.59 2.19 2.07 2.04
5.74 1.49 1.97 2.U7
6.29 -'.04 2.04 2.01
5.66 1. )9 1.96 1.92
5.71 2.11 1.94 2.04
5.76 2.10 1.97 1.93
6.19 2.10 2.02 2.00
4.62 l.<9 1.93 1.90
6.11 2.15 2.31 1»97
5.96 2.12 1.99 1.94







4.37 1.94 1.90 1.95
4.72 1.39 1.94 .96










4,93 2.01 1.95 2.01
0»$1 0»52 C S3 1
I. 4 1.41 • "9 1
i:i:
1.41 .*^ !
1.41 • «9 L
1.34 1.41 ,50 I
1. 4 1.41 ."^ i
1.59 1.39 .4« 1
1.34 1.41 .*i I
1.34 1.41 .SI I
1. 9 1.39 • 4b I
1. 9 1.38 • *4 I
1.59 1.39 • *' I
1- * 1.41 • SO 1




1.33 Ai I1.34 1.41
1.33 .41 .49 1
1.58 .39 .46 I
1.33 1.41 .48 1
kli .41 1 .51 1.39 1 .46 1










1.59 .39 .45 1
1.33 1.41 .49 1
1.34 1.41 .51 1
1.33 1.40 .49 1
.34 1.40 .49 1




.33 1.40 .47 I
1.34 1.41 .50 1
.33 1.49 .51 1
.34 1.40 .51 1
1.34 1.41 .52 1
1.59 1.38 .50 1
.3) 1.41 • 53 I





.33 .40 .47 I
.59 .52 44 1
.59 1.33 .45 1
.3) .40 .46 1
1.33 .39 .51 1
1.54 .39 .45 1
1.31 .36 .41 1
1.31 .36 .41 1
1.59 .52 .47 1
1.58 .52 . 44 1
1.58 .38 .49 1









1.59 1.55 .47 1
1.58 1.54 .4) 1
1.59 1.38 .49 1
1.58 1.37 .43 1
1.33 1.41 .52 1




1.31 .36 .41 1
1.33 1.40 .50 1
1.34 1.40
•AA i1.32 1.37
1.33 1.40 .51 1
Irii
ijl a\\1. 31.9 .38 ,51 1
1.54 .33 .49 1





1.58 1.52 .49 1
1.59 1.38 .50 1





1.32 1.33 ..4 1
1.39 1.47 .44 1






1.33 l.<0 .45 1
1.31 1.36 .50 1
.5'. 1.38 ,49 I
1.39 .59 1
1.35 .40 1
1.41 1.35 .40 1





























03.9 133.9 03.9 5..1 0.0 0.0
04.0
03.?
104.0 04.0 56.1 0.0 0.4






1C9.9 09.9 95.1 59.6 0.0
04.1 1C7.7 07.7 56.1 58.6 0.0
04.0 107.6 07.6 56.1 59.6 3.0
05.9 105.9 05.9 9).
2
0.0 0.0
06.0 106.0 06,9 95.1 0.0 0.0




03.0 0.0 CO 50.4






























19.9 95.1 75.0 0.0
06. 09.9 95.1 59.6 o.c
06..
06.3
110.2 10.2 95.1 45.2
i:i109.9 09.9 85.1 59.6
04. 108.3 08.3 56.1 65.2
l:i04. 107.7 07.7 56.1 59.6
06.1 107.1 07.1 95.1 17.6 0.0
04. 1C4.5
ico.o
94.5 85.1 5.6 0.0
00.,
00.9




04,5 104.5 64.1 0.0 o.o
04.0 104.0 04.2 56.1 0.0
S:S04.5 104.9 04.9 42.3 5.6
04.1
04.5
104.6 04.6 56.1 9.5 0.0
















110.0 95.1 59.6 115.1
109.3 15.7 42.3 59.6 115.4
4.3 107.9
109.4
15.6 5 6.1 58.6 122.7
05.2 16.6 68.6 65.2 109.6
6.5 110.2 17.3 86.6 59.6 109.6
04.9 IC8.5 15.9 62.3 58.6 116.9
06.3 111.0 18.2 35. 75.0 109.6
06.5 110.2 17.7 <5.1 58.6 116.9
04.4 109.4 16.5 56. 65.2 124.1
5.0 109.2 09.2 68.6 65.2 0.3







1 1.7 11.7 76.9
119.9 10.9 85.1 75.0 o.o
06.3 1 l.O
1 9.9
11. 95.1 75.0 9.0
06.3 09.9 95.4 58.6 9.0

















06.2 107.7 95.1 24.7










00.0 100.0 04.3 O.u 0.9 49.4
04.9 104.9 05.2 63.6 0.0 4.4














04.5 104.5 42.3 0.0 9.2




3:5 i-A04.9 L04. 9 05.5 48.6
06.3 106.3 17.2 95.1 CO 172.0
06.1 106.1 06.2 96.9 0.0 1.5
06.4 110,4 19.2 95.1 65.2 115.9
04.1 108.3 16.4 56.1 45.2 124.6
05.2 109.4 17.1 49.6 45.2 117.2




























































































































































































































































































































fT» OtV/» « MPS • le >0
JT .10 .038 .1199 12.98
sa .10 .J62 .1597 11.49
99 .10 .S64 .11,16 13.^4
,9l
.11 -.038 .0715 14.44
:i} ::iU :n\i 14.80H3 13.19
n* .11 -.318 .0493 14.4 1




911 .09 .071 .1594 4.92
199 .09 .050 .1431 14.14
i^l
.10 .044 .1404 13.79




0* . .J37 .1357 13.24
2 I
ul .06« .1610 11.66.037 .1 jao 12.96
13.66. .368 . 44 3
; <i . 1 .000 . 383 12.11
12.3*
:\ . .036 .1369













J 9 .10 .068 .1647 13.79
219 .10 .073 .1687 13.49




m -.026-.029 .3»''l 13.68.11 .0832 14.04
2S
29
.10 .070 .1667 13.49
. .070 .1668 13.70
30 .005 .1114 13.94






: J -AH .lliia.1586 11: 18
. .03a .1391 12.91
t>






:i .,^400 12.99: 44 -.049 .1589 13.31
245 .12 -.041 .3770 13.13
24a













95 .13 .060 .1572 1 1.35
5»
. 5!
.11 -.034 .3913 13.79
.12 -.0 32 .1324 13.32
259











2a4 .061 .1583 13.47









.10 .449 .1442 13.31
76 .10 .0 36 .1169 12.90
•77
.10 .071 .1673 13.80
79 .10 .041 .1414 13.12
90 . .069 .1652 13.74
1 . ] .036 .137; 13.01













2 -.004 .3974 14,7
93 .11 .008 .1139 14. .1
4
. 1 -.028 .0969 13.74
97
;4 -.3 14-.329 .3932 13.6798 .3845 11.47
9
00
. 1 .015 .1213 13.47
. 1 .002 .1086 13.14
303
5 4
. 2 -.329 .3361 11.47
.11 -.010 .1323 13.63
3 6 . 1 .307 . 1134 :2.39
3 7
: 2 :i .006 .1 127 12.37






. 1 -.329 .3868 3.61
} <
.








.33! .1369 13. >i
i 1
.
.077 .1713 13. 79
. .042 .1410 13.34
i S
.10 .05} .1520 11.31








.004 .1 121 13.6)
341 .017 .1229 13. '5




, .312 .1189 11. '>4




13.49 15. 'O 14
13.4* 16.12 IS
14.44 16.88 16








13. '5 16.3 15
11.45 15.47 14
13.31 14. SS 14
11.12 14.12 14
1.24 15.40 14



























: .91 14.77 14
12.83 14.77 14




























































3.44 15. 5< 14
3.44 16. 5u 15











1 1.41 15.72 14
I 1.75 15. )9 15
11.9' 15.87 16
13.6 16.43 .5
11.66 15. S6 15
12.81 14.29 14
(HI (HZ i'ii i3>5i 0';: am ism 1 isn 2 (Sh 1 s i 1 s i 2 s i 3 *»»i iiaz aaai
42 1.18 .31 1.89
4> 1.19 .83 1.98
32 .19 2.01
.4 2.11 .04 2.10
48 2.J5 ..04 2.18
89 2.11 .19
i:\l4w 2.35 !.07
99 2.11 1.30 2.04












18 1.17 .97 2.U0





31 1.79 .79 1.85
81 1.19 .85 2.01
80 1.87 .85 2..0
06 1.19 .38 2.31
05 1.37 .88 2.01
13 l.|9 .02 2.19
43 2.15 .38 Z.-i
79 2.10 .97 1. 19
71 2.11 .14 2.04
54 2.09 .15 2.03
55 2.15 !.07 2.03
74 1.18 1.17 2.04











45 1.95 .93 1.89





53 i.in .94 1.90
42 1.19 .83 1.90
49 1.8' .34 1.99
17 2.05 .02 2.07






4l i:U .80 1.9549 .14 2.00





45 1.18 .83 1.99
42 1.14 .30 1.84
45 1.14 .81 1.14
58 1.14 .iZ 1.97
41 2.35 .05 2.10
4i 1. (5 .15 1.99
5! 2.J4 .14 1.97
95 1.18 .19 2. 39
95 1.38 .19 1.15
39 1.42 .30 1.87
51 2.05 .94 2.03
44 2.05 .93 hll44 2.05 .93
32 1.95 .81 1.39
33 1. 79 .19 1.90
47 1.13 .81 1.92
43 1.13 .11 1.87
24 1.79 .73 1.34
31 1.79 .79 1.85
44 1.17 .33 1.19
05 1.19 .01 2.17
38 1.93 < .01 2.07
53 ;.ie .01 1.19U 2.05 .91 1.99
48 2.10 .16 1.13
36 1.14 .12 2.30
43 1.18 .95 2.34
12 2.10 .01 1.19
27 2.04 .0! 2. CO
34 1.33 .79 1.84
33 1.33 . 79 1. 34
5 2.33 .93 1.89
47 1.37 .33
51 1.17 .94
34 1.82 . 79


















30 1 . ^8 .30
26 2.u> . U
29 1.14 .11
28 1.19 .73 1.65
aaa ••« •«
\:U 1.37.37 1^42 lo?!' 11.1 111.11.49 105.5 10.8 113.8
1.33 1.40 1.51 104.4 08.8 108.8
1.59 .54 l.>4 104.2 08.0 108.0
1.54 ..54 1.47 104.2 07.5 101.
i













1.32 1.40 .52 \n:i 00.0 104.61.32 1.39 .45 00.
10.0
106.4
1.32 1.38 1.44 100.0 107.1
108.
4













1.33 .50 104.7 07.0 137.0
l!9.4\:l 1.36 .41 105.9105.5
1OT.4
09.4
1.38 .SO 07.9 107.9
i.j' 1. 5 1.39 10.9 110.8
1.30 1. 5 .39 107.0 10.7 113.7
1.33 1. 9
:U 104.4 s::? 107.1. 4 114.2 110.
1
1. 18 1.51 105.
S
05.5 107.7




1.31 1.34 104.3 09.4 109.4
1.32 .37 .51 105.4 05.4 109.5
1.31 .34 .51 104.3 04.3 109.2
1.49 .37 1.49 104.3 06.3 104.9
1.53 1. 8 .51 106.5 C6.5 117.
1.5. 1.38 .50 104.5 10.4 113.9
1.58 t.47 1.49 104.4
104.7
11.2 118.1
1.3: 1.39 .52 09.2 111.4




1.32 .39 05.4 0.^ 118.4
I. 51
I. 5.
• 52 1.49 04.5 1.1 U9.3


















1.47 .40 107.2 12.4 121.3
l.S .47 .42 106.7 11.5 119.9
1.S7 1.37 1.45 1C4.' 10.8 119.2
hit .37 .42 104.9 11.111.0 \il-A.37 .42 105.7
1.40 1.35 .49 107.0 12.4 112.4
1.53 1.52 .41 114.4 11.3 111.3
1.48 .37 .49 116.8 11.3 111.3
1.38 .35 1.44
liVA 13.0 113.l.3i • 34 .39 13.3
10.3
113.3
1.30 .35 .46 106^7 110.3
1.S8 .47 .47 106.5 11.3
{li:i1.50 1.39 1.40 107.1 12.3
1.58 1.39 1.49 104.6 IC.4 113.5
1.54 1.31 1.43 134.4 10.9 110.1
1.49 1.34 1.49 106.8 12.0 112.0
1.47 1.35 1.40 107.2
i-A
112.4
..47 1. 34 1.47 104.9 112.3
1.32 1.37 1.48 105.7 09.0 109.0
1.S4 1.54 1.47 104.3 C3.2 109.2
1.44 1.34 1.49 106.9 C9.2 119.2
1. 5 1.37 1.49 114.4 09.3 109.0










107.81.32 1.39 1.43 00.0
1.32 1.38 1.51 ico.o
2S:I
107.4
109.5!.31 1.34 1.41 100.0
1.30 1.34 1.43 107.1 07.1 110.9
1.31 1.34 1.44 106.0 04.0 119.8
1.31 1.36 1.41 101.5 11.5 109.9
;.34
1.30
1.34 1.33 107.7 57.7
07.3 Ui-A1.34 1.J9 107.3
1.47 1.35 1.49 104.8 09.9 1:9.9
..49 1.50 1.48 104.3 04.3 109.3
>.49 1.17 1.51 34.6 04.4 118.5
1.58 1.55 1.49 04.5 04.5 119.3
1.54 1.37 1.50 06.4 11.2 119.7
1.58 1.47 1.49 104. 11.3 119.7
1.44 1.34 1.50 104.9 11.6 120.0
1.49 1.4 7 1.49 106.7
10 6.5
11.7 119. 7
1.58 1.51 1.49 11.3 119.4
1.53 1.38 f.so 104.7 10.5 113.5
1.38 1.34 1.39 107.5 13.3 1.2.4
1.38 1.34 1.39 107.5 13.3 122.4
1.56 1.45 1.42 106.1 11.3 120.4
1.41 .38 1.49 107.0 12.6 1 2.4
1.48 .45 1.48 106.8 12.0 112.3
1.36 1.34 : .46 117.3 IC.l 110.9
1.54 .45 1.47 104.4 11.5 111.5
I.sa .47 1.48 104.4 11.4 1 4.1
1.45 1.35 1.44 107.0 10.3 .19.3
1.55 .45 1.47 104.4 09.4 109.4
1.47 .45 1.43 114.9
101.1
09.9 109.9










1.32 .39 1.44 100. CO.O 107.5
1.30 .35 .40 lOC.O 02.2 110.4
1.31 1.36 .41 101.5
i\:l
119.8
1.34 1.34 .33 101.4 lll.l
..34
:Vr




1.44 .ji 1.51 04.8 in.
l.«9 1. jO 1.50 C4.6 34.4 111.5
1.J4 1.41 1.49 104.4 11.4 120.2
1.44 1.4] I.4I 134.1 12.1 123.6






70.5 80.5 . 04 .104
59.0 68.3 0.0 . 09 .104 .10*




















0.0 94.9 .101 .10* .194
3.0
73.1
0.0 193.8 .104 .101




ii.i 0.0 .097 .109 .10.













51.7 0.0 .099 .101 .100
.10360.5
74.0
0.9 35.4 .1^8 .1C4
3:3
53.4 .102 .100 .100
71.4 33.5 .104 .1C4 .10*







10.2 0.0 44.5 .104 .102 .10*
31.3 0.0 42.7 .190 .112 .105
38.2 0.0 9.4 .105 .107 .119
34.4 CO 172.8 .107 .110 .119
95.1 65.2 124.4 .111 .107 .197
3 5.1 74.7 116.1 . 110 .107 .119
61.6 71.0 124.2 .108 .105 .108





















62.1 59.2 • lor
41.0 30.5 124.7 .099 .102
:}3:33.0 80.5 126.9 .099 .102
98.3 4 7.7 126.9
:i3:
.107
:13:38. r 39.5 126.4
124.1
.102
95.1 76.7 . 10 .138 . 05
15.1 65.2 126.2 . 10 .109 . OS
95.6 67.7 12 6.9 . 99 .137 . 0*
70.5 1C.5 124.7 .194 .102 . 0*




:li338.5 64.5 .105 . 05
41.8 39.5 0.0 .."19
:j99 .102 :3*91.8 30.5 0.0 .102
.lOl15.1 41.4 0.0 .C99 .
.5.1 74.7 0.0 . 10 .108 .105
87.4 79.4 0.0 .Uo .113 .191
35.1 65.2 43.5 . 11 .108 .105
35.7 47.9
3:3
. 09 .104 .19*
98.2
38.7
79.3 . 05 .103 .195
90.5 0.0




34.4 29.2 .108 .110 .109





0.0 .101 .104 .104
2U 111.4 .1 Jl . 104 .1010.0 114.1 .095 .319 .109
VA 0.0
110.4 .104 .102 .10*




112.1 .104 . 101
:13S11 4.1 .100 .318
99.5 0.0 52.1 .09 7 . 100 .102
16.0 0.0 52.1 .102 .100 .102






33.5 123.5 .097 . 02
98.4 44.1 3.0 .104 . 0*
39.2 0.0 25.0 .135 :i6r . 19
33.2
3:3
Ul.O .135 .107 .119
95.4 200.4 .110 .110 .109
3 6.3 TO.
4
124.0 .103 .105 .108
95.1 74.7 124.4 .110 .107 . 07
99. 1 69.3 123.7 .133 .106 . 08
39.2 74.7 117.8 .105 .107 . 10
95.1 75.2 124.4 .111 .110 . or
36.7 59.8 124.4 .107 .110 .107
91.8 30.5 124.7 .099 .102 .10*
91.8 30.5 126.9 .099 .102 .104
35.4 77.3 U6.1 .109 .107 .10*
li'A
79.4 0.0 .101 .103 .106




35.7 77.3 .109 .107 .104








•At91.4 47.3 .100 102
9.0 7.9 111.5 .100
.luO
.102 . 05
6.1 0.0 114.8 .103 . 09
3.0 3.0 14.0 .101 .104




.10253.2 28.5 . ICO




99.0 0.0 .104 .136 .709
33.2 CO 194. ; .10 5 .KJ .110
14.3 79.0 124.0 .133 .105 .108
59.1 77. 7 123.4 .134 ..04
.10935.8 0.0 124.1 .095 .098
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